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Dominican  public hospitals provide health care inefficiently,
with enormous  shortages  of goods and equipment,  with exces-
sive personnel,  especially  physicians,  and with few incentives
for, or controls  on, quality performance.  The organization  and
delivery  of health  care  require  basic  reform,  with  more  account-
ability and quality control and better  physician  payment  prac-
tices.
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Measuring  costs in public hospitals  in develop-  * (For selected  diagnoses)  die specifics  of
ing countries  is hampered  by the lack of an  clinical  practices  In the hospital,  compared  with
appropriate  costing  system,  or of any systematic  accepted  clinical  norms for the Dominican
cost accounting.  Invoices  for goods  and services,  Republic.
prices  for inputs, and patient  records are gener-
ally absent As a result,  "cost measures"  have  They found  that average  and total costs of
historically  been based on budget  figures  -the  services  understate  the true costs  - because  of
only available  financial  data. But budget  alloca-  shortages,  inappropriate  and underused  person-
tions bear little relationship  to the resources  nel, and nonfunctioning  equipment.  Quality  of
actually required  to provide  services  to hospital  care measures  suggest  low quality  and poor
patients.  efficiency.  Norms  of medical  practice were  not
followed  in more than 80 percent of the cases
The patient-based  methodology  described  by  examined.  Rates  of completion  for diagnostic
Lewis, Sulvetta,  and LaForgia  circumvents  this  tests were below 50 percent for outpatient
problem  by measuring  actual  hospital  resources  services  and between  60 and 70 percent for
allocated  to patients.  Their study was conducted  inpatient  and emergency  services.  The study
in a single Dominican  hospital  during a one-  registered  significant  monthly  "savings"  of $641
week period in April 1989.  Their  approach  for noncompletion  of tests and $824 for
documents  and gives  prices for goods, services,  nonavailability  of drugs.
and personnel  time provided  by the hospital  to
emergency  patients,  inpatients,  and outpatients.  Policy recommendations  of Lewis, Sulvetta,
and LaForgia  center on the need to reform  the
They used the following  to measure  quality  organization  and delivery  of health care as vell
and efficiency:  as physician  payment  practices  - and to giving
more  authority  to hospital  administrators.  To
* The qualifications  and relative  costs of  make Dominican  hospitals  more efficient,  there
medical  manpower  delivering  services.  must be greater  autharity and accountability  for
hospital  directors  and better incentives  for
* The extent and nature of shortages.  improving  medical  and management  perfor-
mance. Quality  assurance  needs great improve-
* Comparisons  of physician  ordets and actual  ment if the Dominican  system is to ensure a
services  provided.  basic  standard  of care.
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Costs  are  the  basis  for  measuring  efficiency  in the  delivery  of all  goods
and  servic-.  . Health  care  is  no  exception.  To  maximize  efficiency,  total  costs-
-and marginal  costs  in particular--are  essential  elements  because  they capture
the  differences  in  resources  required  to produce  a  given  output. As such,  costs
are fundamental  inputs  into  resource  allocation  decisions.
Quality  must also contribute  to resource  allocation  decisions  in health
care.  Without  a  basic level  of quality,  improvements  in  quantity  or  efficiency
are meaningless.  Indeed,  quality and efficiency  are not mutually exclusive
goods,  since  poor  organization  or  management  that lead  to inefficiency  can  also
allow quality  to deteriorate. Good clinical  practice  requires  oversight  and
quality  control  measures  to establish  and  maintain  standards  of care.
In  most  developing  countries,  governments  have  committed  themselves  to  the
financing  and delivery  of free health  care for all citizens  in an effort  to
ensure  equal access. As a result,  the  public  sector  dominates  the delivery  of
health  care in  most  countries. Due  to  the lack  of sound  methodologies  and  data,
public  health  care delivery  costs  are typically  measured  by expenditures,  and
quality has been largely  unmeasured."  Despite  the latter,  an undefined but
acceptable  standard  of quality  and  efficiency  is implicitly  assumed  to exist  in
public facilities,  and comparisons  of "cost" estimates across countries or
facilities  involve  similar  assumptions.  However,  equating  costs  with
expenditures  is fallacious.  It distorts  the definition  of costs since the
efficiency  of expenditures  is unknown,  quality  is uncertain,  and benefits  are
unmeasured because expenditures only  capture budgetary flows  and  their
allocation.
Studies  by Mills  et al. (1989),  Russell  et al. (1988)  and  Raymond  et al.
(1986) adopted the budget allocation (or full cost accounting)  method for
measuring costs in Malawi, St. Lucia, and Belize, respectively.  Each has
applied  a traditional  hospital  costing  approach  that  divides  the hospital  into
cost centers and effectively  analyzes  where resources are distributed,  but
without  regard  to  how  they  are  applied. The final  "cost"  is  then  the  allocation
of  the  total  budget,  plus  other  identifiable  transfers. These  studies  are  useful
tools  for  managers  but  are limited  in  that  they are not  tied to the  production
of any service. Moreover  quality  of output  is ignored.
The limits  of traditional  "costing"  efforts  and  the  distortion  of quality
can  be illustrated  by the  phenomenon  of a "unit  cost":  (a) increase,  which can
result  from  a budget  increase  and/or  a  decline  in  patient  load,  and, similarly,
(b) decline due to a  fall in budget allocation  or a rise in the number  of
patients. The  implication  is  that  if  budgets  are  reduced,  costs  will fall;  and,
if the laboratory  is closed  and laboratory  exams  are no longer  provided,  costs
will decline.  There is,  however,  an obvious  loss  of quality  or quantity  from
these decreases in "cost".  Moreover, the distribution  of specific inputs
(personnel,  drugs,  etc.) in  each budget  allocation  cannot  be determined,  which
/ Quality  has  been measured  in  Mexican  social  security  hospitals,  however,
which has  promise  for  application  elsewhere  (Barajas,  1990).2
leads to the  assumption that the distribution  of input costs parallel budget
categories.
Public  hospital  quality  can  be  measured  by  evaluating  either
medical/technical  competence  or  patient  satisfaction.  Donabedian  (1988)
aggregates quality measures of the forrner  into the following broad categories:
(1) structure,  such as peer review,  (2) qualifications  and mix of  staff and
service  delivery  process,  and  (3)  practitioners'  diagnoses  and  treatment
pattjrns.  This study measures quality through all three, by defining norms based
on  Dominican  developed  standards,  comparing  practitioners'  diagnoses  and
treatment patterns with norms for specific diseases and patients, and analyzing
staff qualifications  and mix.t
Two recent studies in Canada (Pineault  et al., 1985) and Colombia (Shepard
et al., 1991) have attempted to measure costs and quality jointly.  Pineault et
al. compare clinical outcomes and costs of care between patients treated on an
outpatient and inpatient basis for three surgical procedures.  Shepard et al.
measure  indirect and direct costs (excluding the costs of diagnostic tests) of
a single surgery in two Colombian health facilities (an  intermediate health unit
and a hospital) and compare the cost, quality and effectiveness of care in each
of the two settings.
Both studies estimate the costs of alternative surgical treatment(s) using
a methodology similar to that applied here.  Their drawbacks are in  the fact that
only a small number of specific treatments are costed out, which do not permit
generalizing  cost  estimates.  Although  both  are  methodological  advances  in
measuring quality and costs in public facilities where cost data are generally
scarce,  they  offer  limited  information  rec-arding  hospital  costs  other  than
surgery.  Moreover,  their  methodologies  are  only  appropriate  for  surgical
procedures.  They cannot be applied to inpatient or outpatient care  where costing
is more difficult due to the range and severity of diagnoses and the need to
track and cost-out patient contact with different medical services.  As a result,
their policy implications are severly limited.  The findings are useful for fine
tuning how a hospital provides some surgical services, but they cannot provide
policy guidance to policymakers and hospital directors on the efficiency, costs
and effectiveness of the health services provided.
This study  goes beyond estimates of surgeries to measuring cost and  quality
of  all types of hospital services (inpatient,  outpatient, emergency and surgery).
In doing so, an innovative methodology  is developed and applied to accommodate
the limitations of existing approaches, to compensate for the complete  lack of
data in Dominican public hospitals, and to produce findings that inform policy
on key issues regarding hospital performance and productivity.  A general public
hospital in the Dominican Republic is used for empirical estimation.
2/ See Lewis et. al, 1992 for detailed analysis of staff qualifications  and
mix applying the data from this study.
3/ Pineault et. al (1985) also measure patient perceptions, but this goes
beyond the issues of concern here and are not discussed.3
I1.  BACKGROUND
The Dominican Republic is  a Caribbean island of about 6  million people and
a per capita income in 1988 of US$720.  Unemployment was about 30 percent in 1985
according to the Central Bank, but has reportedly risen more recently.
Infant  mortality is  estimated at between 80 and  84 per thousand live  births,  with
most deaths due largely to preventable causes (Rodriguez-Grossi, 1989).  Health
care services are available in both the private and public  sectors, with the
latter made  up  of  State  Secretariat  of Public  Health  and Social  Assistance
(SESFsS) hospitals and clinics, and social security (IDSS) and armed forces and
national police  (ISSFAPOL) facilities.  Care is provided free of charge to all
patients, although only SESPAS facilities are open to all citizens as enrollment
in special public insurance plans is not a prerequisite as is  the case  with IDSS
and ISSFAPOL.
SESPAS Organization and Financing of Hospital Care
SESPAS provides care for the population it serves through 34 general and
specialty hospitals and 392 health centers and clinics owned, operated, and
largely 'inanced by the government.  SESPAS provides monthly budgets for these
facilities, controls  the hiring of all medical  and nonmedical  personnel,  and
directly pays the salaries of hospital staff.  Thus, individual facilities have
little or no control over the number or mix of personnel.
In addition to the budgets provided by SESPAS, facilities also receive in-
kind transfers of essential pharmaceuticals and supplies through a SESPAS sub-
organization  entitled  Program  of  Essential  Medicines,  or  PROMESE.  This
suborganization  is charged with the purchasing and distribution  of drugs and
medical/surgical  supplies to SESPAS facilities.  Ordering and distribution  of
drugs is largely undertaken without input from hospital users.  The drugs and
supplies  are  purchased  from  local  distributors  or  manufacturers  in  bulk,
reportedly  at bulk-rate  prices,  although  the  latter cannot  be  verified with
current recordkeeping  practices.
Additional,  albeit sporadic, support for SESPAS facilities has come from
the Office of the President, which has made special drugs and funds available;
donor projects; and other miscellaneous  sources.  In addition, many facilities
have charges for non-inpatient services despite the official government policy
that health care  is  to be provided free of charge to SESPAS patients (La Forgia,
1989; Lewis, 1992).
Hospitals  are financed by SESPAS through provision of monthly transfers
meant to cover all variable (non-personnel) costs.  Personnel are hired and paid
centrally with the value recorded against each hospital's total budget.  Budget
allocations are primarily based on the prior year's allocation.  Data on other
allocations  from the central government  are rare.  PROMESE does not maintain
records  on  what  supplies  or  drugs  individual  hospitals  have  received,  and
information on prices paid by PROMESE are difficult to obtain.4
SESPAS  facilities  do  not  collect  cost  information.  The  hospital
administrators  know the monthly subsidy received from SESPAS for nonpersonnel
expenditures, but rarely have information on what monthly expenditures are, even
by  major  expenditure  category  (e.g.  food,  supplies,  administration,  etc.).
Patient record information is spotty at best, so that frequently administrators
do not even know how many patients they treat each year.  As a result, SESPAS is
unable to develop budgets for its individual facilities which relate in any way
to the actual operating expenses in the facility.  Most importantly, there is no
means to gauge the efficiency or effectiveness of resource use.
The current system has few incentives and fundamental distortions in the
organization and financing of health care.  The effects of  these policy decisions
and their implementation are measured and discussed here through the examination
of quality and the costs of quality in a SESPAS hospital.
Survey Site:  Avbar Hospital
Aybar Hospital is a 271-bed teaching facility in a poor barrio of Santo
Domingo.  The main hospital was  constructed  in 1945.  The  facility has  four
operating  theaters,  23 outpatient consultation  rooms,  and an emergency  wing.
Twenty-nine  specialty services are provided, including particular  strength in
ophthalmology and gastroenterology.
Aybar has 230 physicians, including residents and interns.  Nurses (208),
laboratory technicians  (19), administrative staff (41) and others (61) make up
the staff of about 560 (Candelario et al., 1988; Corona Bueno, 1989).  Based on
the results of this survey, it  serves about 78,000 emergency patients and 125,000
outpatients per year.  Approximately 2,000 operations are performed each year.
The occupancy rate is  estimated to be between 90 and 100  percent depending
on the specialty with some ward occupancies over 100 percent not uncommon.  The
survey estimated the overall average length of stay at 9 days, but lengths of
stay vary, with  internal medicine  estimated at 24 days  and surgery  at 8.The
hospital  estimates  that  about  25 percent  of drugs  are  paid  for by  patients
because the hospital either is not supplied with the drug(s) or does not have the
resources to buy them  (Candelario et al., 1988).  The study results suggest that
the overall figure is closer to 50 percent, with outpatients buying most drugs
from private outlets but few inpatients purchasing their own drugs.
The official budget of the hospital in 1989 was DR$531,334 (US$84,607) per
month.  The monthly non-salary portion of DR$113,573  (US$18,084) is transfered
to the hospital.  Salaries amount to 79 percent of the total monthly transfer,
and are managed and paid by SESPAS, and are effectively outside the hospital's
control.  The  value  of additional  transfers  from PROMESE or the  President's
special fund are not known for the reasons indicated above.
Controlling the hospital is difficult, because staff do not report to nor
are they beholden to hospital management.  With staff assigned and deployed from
the center, hospital managers have little or no control over staff performance
or location.  Shortages exist in equipment for both diagnosis and treatment and
reliable supplies are few.  Much of this is due to nonavailability  from PROMESE
and other central government sources, as well as the inadequacy of the operating5
budget to meet the needs of the patient 'volume. Thus the facility is hamstrung
by rigid bureaucratic arrangements.
These circumstances do not differ from reports of other hospital directors
in the Dominican  Republic  and are  similar  to observations  elsewhere  in the
region.  In this sense, Aybar Hospital is typical.
Medical  Staff  Characteristics  and  Earnings
Because  medical  staff  constitute  such  a  larger  proportion  of  the  hospital's
SESPAS  budget  and medical  qualifications  are important  measures  of quality,  a
brief  description  of  the  medical  staff,  their  characteristics,  and  earnings  are
provided  here.
Salaries  for specific  types  of workers  are set  with minimal  differences
across  employees. Employees  receive  no fringe  benefits  outside  of  meals in  the
hospital.  Rigidity in salaries  prevents  adjustments  for staff education  or
experience. Therefore  the  earnings  of  physicians  with  20 years  of experience  is
identical  to  that  of a  new  medical  graduate. More importantly,  rewards  for  good
performance  either through bonuses or promotion are impossible  under this
simplistic  system  of employment.
Aybar had 56 interns  assigned  to the hospital  during  the study  period.
Interns  are not paid,  although  they are provided  meals.  Interns  are in their
last  year of undergraduate  training  in  medicine. Unemployment  among  physicians
is  high  in  the  Dominican  Republic. Interns  are  virtually  unemployable  as  medical
staff  and  employment  prospects  outside  of  medicine  are  poor  given  an  unemployment
rate  of  around  30 percent.  Hence  a  shadow wage  for medical  staff  is not
appropriate.
The  physician-nurse  ratio  of  235:208  is  inefficient  given  patterns  observed
in  other  countries. Low levels  of  compensation  and  limited  potential  for  upward
mobility  offered  by  this  system  provide  a perverse  set  of incentives  for  medical
staff.  These incentives  are further  distorted  by the fact  that personnel  are
paid regardless  of whether  they perform  their  duties. And good performance  is
not rewarded.  Thus, the issue of personnel  is a serious one for the hospital,
particularly  as it  relates  to  both  hospital  costs  and  quality  of care (Lewis,  et
al, 1992).
III. METHODOLOGY
The  study  was designed  to adjust  for  the shortcomings  of existing  methods
for measuring costs in public hospitals, and for the gross lack of cost,
performance  and quality  data in all Dominican  public hospitals.  This survey
provided  the first  data on hospital  operation,  finances  and performance  in  the
Dominican  Republic.  As is typical for Dominican  hospitals,  no routine data
collection  existed for utilization  or diagnoses;  no surveys  of any aspect  of
hospital service quantity, patient volume or quality of care had ever been
undertaken;  and price  and  cost information  on human,  material  and  financial6
inputs were virtually unknown.  Even inventory systems were lacking.  The study
collected the  information regularly  included in patient  records  in developed
countries.  This entailed tracking patients as they moved through the hospital
and recording the type and quantity of all services, pricing all components of
those  hospital  services,  collectinc  price  data  for  all  delivered  services,
estimating  time costs of medical personnel, and undertaking a measure  of all
indirect costs.
Cost and Data Collection Methodology and Approach
Variable  costs  were  collected  using  a  combination  of  time  and motion
studies to examine the nature and cost of medical services, and the resource use
and value of ancillary services and other inputs devoted to patient care.  Close
to  census  samples  were  taken  since  virtually  no  information  on  patients,
providers or non-personnel inputs existed for the hospital.
Survey of Patients.  A set of questionnaires and registries was developed
and implemented in Aybar Hospital during the period April 17 through 28, 1989.
The questionnaires  were  used to collect  information on patient  socioeconomic
characteristics,  patient care time by medical staff, and use of consumaLles,
drugs, diagnostic tests and operating theater; registries collected information
on  services  rendered  to  categories  of  patients  not  surveyed  with  the
questionnaires.  A set of questions on shortages and their  impact on medical
decisions  was also  included to capture the extent of unusable  or unavailable
equipment,  instruments,  consumables  or  drugs. 4'  All  questionnaires  were
pretested by a team of Dominican physicians.  Data collectors were all graduated
physicians.
The  sampled  patients  include  the  following:  all  patients  entering
emergency service over a one-week period; a sample of outpatient visits during
that week, and those not included in the outpatient  survey were  inventoried; 5'
and inpatients admitted to five of the hospital's  18 wards during  a two-week
period  (3 surgical wards and 2 ophthalmology wards).  Inpatients were tracked
daily after the termination of the survey until their discharges.  Hence, the
sample of inpatients was not truncated.
Time  allocation  of all physicians  and nurses providing  care  to or  for
patients was included in the emergency, outpatient, and inpatient surveys.  Data
collectors  recorded  the amount  of medical  attention,  administration  for the
patient, and supervision/observation of/by medical staff (to  capture teaching and
4/  The Spanish language questionnaires are contained in Appendix A of Lewis
et al. (1990).
5/ Originally all outpatients were to be surveyed; however, the concentration
of consultations in the early hours of the day due to physicians' schedule
preferences, forced physicians to double and triple up in consultation rooms.
Thus, the enumerators  surveyed as many patients as possible, and only counted
the overflow whom they did not have time to include in the survey.7
learning).  In addition, the level of staff providing survices to patients was
recorded to allow differentiation in  physicians and nurses services cost.  Among
inpatients, time and motion studies conducted over one week provided the basis
for extrapolating an average amount of medical attention for subsequent periods.
A separate survey form was used for drugs, diagnostic tests and surgery.
Where drugs were ordered, prescribed, given to the patients (to  take at home) or
applied  to the  patient,  the  drug  and  the hospital's  source  (e.g., PROMESE,
private sources, SESPAS, etc.) were recorded.  Who paid for the drugs and who
applied them to inpatients and emergency patients were included to allow costing
of donated drugs.  Subsequent follow-up and matching with registries--set up bv
the project at all sources of drugs (subsidized sale of drugs at Botica Popular;
pharmacy in  the  hospital) and  all diagnostic test sites--provided information on
whether the hospital filled  prescriptions, or followed  orders properly or at all.
Twenty-three surgical operations were surveyed, with an attemp_ to gain at
least two wound, appendicitis, cataract, hysterectomy and hernia operations so
that  some  rough  average  for  operations  in  general,  and  specific  kinds  of
procedures  in particular,  could  be  costed  out.  The  level  and  function  of
personnel in the operating room were recorded along with the use of equipment,
instruments, consumables, drugs and pharmaceutical products.
A registry to capture patient flow on the wards was included in the survey
to  allow  calculation  of  occupancy  rates.  Registries  in  the  first  aid  and
immunization rooms captured patients using only those services and the time use
of nurses, and a registry of social workers summed the number of daily patient
visits.
Collection of Prices.  No price information existed in the hospital prior
to the study.  Price information for drugs and consumables  -he  hospital received
from the central government  and  for goods the hospital purchased  outside the
facility at wholesale and retail outlets was collected directly from the soui.e.
Inventories of stocks were usually available.  How much the government paid for
those products, and the unit cost of items obtained in bulk, were obtained from
the multiple  sources of goods.
Unit prices of all potential inputs  (hospital official  stock and actual
usage varied) were obtained from all sources.  For example, all drug prices for
different concentrations and  presentations (liquid,  tablet etc.) from  the various
sources used by the hospital (PROMESE, the drug procurement parastatal; SESPAS;
Office  of the  President;  private  distributors;  and private  pharmacies)  were
collected.  The unit cost of each lab, x-ray, pathology and special test was
calculated  using the  appropriate  fraction of technicians'  time, consumables,
reagents and any other inputs.
Prices were obtained from: sear.,ing PROMESE records for  what was paid for
different products, reviewing SESPAS financial records, studying receipts in  the
hospital's  accounts,  interviews  with  pharmaceutical  companies  and  their
distributors,  interviews with medical equipment distributors,  interviews with
distributors of special items such as oxygen, and private pharmacists.  In all,
prices for 154 consumable  items and 1002 drugs were obtained.8
Data  -Collection.  Data  collectors (enumerators)  were  dispatched to
different  sites with a stack  of questionnaires,  and followed  between  one and
three  patients  at a time.  Data  collectors  were equi.pped  with a stop  watch  for
each  patient. Time  allocation  by  staff  and  use  of  all  equipment,  consumables  and
orders  for  tests or drugs  were recorded  by that data collector,  and attending
medical staff interviewed. Supervisors  reviewed  completed  fcrms after every
shift,  and  filled  out  the  codes  for  diagnoses,  symptoms,  drugs,  and  other  goods,
Each patient entering Aybar  hospital was  assigned a  number and  an
enumerator  to  track  the  services  received  from  the  hospital  in  outpatient,  wards
and emergency.  Supervisors  reviewed  completed forms  after every shift, and
filled  out the codes for diagnoses,  symptoms,  drugs, and other goods.  The
information  collected  was the following:  the time, type of personnel (e.g.,
level of  physician or  nurse, or  other) and  kind of  service (attention,
supervision/observation,  and  administration)  received  based  on  observation;  use
of other inputs  (consumables,  equipment)  based on observation;  the nature  and
reason for  shortages according to  the  attending physician; socioeconomic
information  from  the patient;  and  diagnoses  and  ordered  tests  or drugs  from  the
attending physician(s).
Those patients who had other services indicated (drugs, tests) had a
questionnaire  filled  out with the appropriate  name and identification  number.
Those  numbered  questionnaires  were used to follow  up to determine  if tests  had
been completed  (and  if  not  why  not),  and  if  ordered  drugs  had  been  obtained  from
the  hospital's  pharmacy  or  botica  popular. Registries  at  each site  for  tests  or
drugs  were used to determine  whether  the ordered  item(s)  had  been obtained  and
the value  of the service  or product.
Surgery questionnaires  were filled  out for the 23 surgical  procedures
sampled  based  on observation  and  interviews  with  the  surgeon(s)  performing  the
operation.  These were not linked to the patients  on the wards.  Although
modifications  in staff  behavior  were anticipated  due  to the study,  no evidence
of shifts  in  behavior  surfaced  when compared  to pre-survey  patterns.
Quality of Care Methodology.  Cuality is captured in four ways in the
study. First,  the  attending  physician  was interviewed  during  the  patient  survey
to determine if any goods or services  were unavailable  for diagnosis,  or if
treatment protocols were modified because of expected or known shortages.
Second, a  set of clinical protocols for specific diagnoses was  developed
outlining Dominican  norms for diagnosis  and treatment.'  Third, the level of
attending medical staff and the time each spent providing medical care to
patients  was recorded. Finally,  ordered  and completed  drug prescriptions  and
diagnostic  tests were matched to measure the cost reductions  due to quality
lapses.
Protocols for hernia, appendicitis,  cataract surgery,  birth, cesarean
section,  hysterectomy, prenatal  care,  diarrhea,  acute  tonsillitis  and
6/ Protocols  developed  for  the  project  are contained  in  Appendix  F  of Lewis
et al. (1990).9
hypertension  were developed  fcr  the Dominican  Republic  by a team of Dominican
physicians. These  ire  used  to compare  practice  patterns  and cocts  of the ideal
procedures  with actual  diagnosis  and  treatment  to evaluate  quality  of care as
weil as possible  unnecessary  expenditures.
IV.  QUALITY  OF CARE
Quality is difficult to measure.  An  important gauge of quality is
typically  the qualifications  of attending  staff.  In the developing  country
context,  the lack  or inappropriate  mix  of manpower  and  other inputs  (e.g.,
drugs,  consumables  and  so  on)  is  reported  to  compromise  quality;  however,  no  good
evidence  exists  on  this  issue. Another  accepted  but  indirect  measure  of  quality
has  been government  expenditures  on health  ot.  on particular  health  facilities.
Unfortunately,  the allocation and use cf resources  is rarely examined, nor is
efficiency  controlled  for,  so  that  this  too  is  an inappropriate  quality  measure.
In attempting to complement these types of measures and adjust for
shortcomings,  data were collected in Aybar Hospital to examine: (1)  the
qualifications  of  medical  manpower  deliverLng  services,  (2)  the  extent  and  nature
of shortages, (3)  the services  on which the hospital  has actually  spent its
resources,  as compared  to what  was  ordered  by physicians,  and, (4)  for  selected
diagnoses,  the specifics  of clinical  practices in the hospital  and how they
compare  to accepted  clinical  norms.  The latter  comparison  is based on norms
developed  by Dominican  physicians  for  this  effort (See  Lewis,  et al. 1990).
Medical  Staff  Time  Allocation
Although almost every patient treated at the hospital received some
physician  attention,  very feo  inpatient  or  emergency  patients  were  treate6  by a
staff  physician  or  higher  level  physician.  Table  1  summarizes  the  doctor-patient
contacts  by physician  level. The  vast  majority  of emergency  and inpatients  were
treated by  interns and  lower level residents (89 percent and  62 percent
respectively).  Outpatients,  however  were  treated  by  higher  level  physicians  86.2
percent  of the time.
Among nursing staff, a similar pattern for inpatients  and emergency
patients  emerges,  with  auxiliary  nurses  providing  over  90  percent  of the  patient
care.  In outpatient  services,  nursing care was minimal--affecting  only 111
patients,  and  provided  almost  exclusively  by auxiliaries.
This  pattern  of care  suggests  a low  level  of service  provided  to  patients,
especially  in emergency  and the wards.  Moreover,  since  most of the attending
physicians  are students,  involvement  of staff  and chief-of-service  physicians
would  be expected. Other  evidence  from  the study  suggests  that few  interns  and
residents are under the supervision  of experienced  physicians.  Very little
supervision/observation  time  was recorded  for  the higher  priced  physicians  who
constitute  the  teaching  staff,  which  means  that  a limited  amount  of instruction
occurs  during  patient  care (See  Lewis  et al., 1992).Table  1
Probability  of  Being  Seen  by  Different  Categories  of
Physicians  and  Nurses  at  Aybar  Hospital
by  Level  of  Training  and  Setting
Emergency  Inpatient  Outpatient
Category  of  N!Uber  ot  Patient  Number  of  Patient  Number  of  Patient
Medical  Staff  Contactsa  %  Contactsa  %  Contactsa  %
Chief  of  Staff/
Staff  Physician  98  3.3  6  4.9  1,336b  86.2
Resident  III-IV  216  7.2  40  32.5  87  5.6
Resident  I-II  1006  33.7  54  43.9  121  7.8
Intern  1669  55.8  23  18.7  206  13.3
Graduate  Nurse  62  8.9  137  17.9  1  1.0
Auxilliary  Nurse  634  91.1  629  82.1  110  99.0
Source:  The  Urban  Institute
a. A contact  does  not  necessarily  represent  the  amount  of  time  a  physician  or
nurse  spent  with  a patient,  but  the  total  number  of  staff  contacts  with
patient(s).  Thus  one  chief  of  staff  physician  could  have  contact  with  6
inpatients,  six  chiefs  of  staff  could  have  treated  one  patient  or  some
multiple  that  produces  six  contacts  between  inpatient(s)  and  chiefs  of
staffs.
b.  Nineteen  general  practitioners  represent  twenty-five  percent  of  staff
physicians  and  provide  about  forty  percent  of  outpatient  consultations.10
Another quality  measure of physician services  is the  small fraction of
contracted  physician  time devoted  to patient  care.  Only  12 percent  of all
SESPAS-contracted time can be accounted for in indirect and direct patient care
in emergency, inpatient, outpati3nt and surgery services.  This suggests that
physicians  are  either  engaged  in a  considerable  amount  of  non-patient  care
activities or that they are not fulfilling their obligations to SESPAS and Aybar
Hospital and are not reporting to the hospital.  In either case, resources are
not being applied to ensure the maximum quality of care for patients, or for  the
efficient use of resources.
Shortages and Noncompliance
While  outpatients  receive more physician care,  their share of hospital
provided drugs, diagnostic tests, and other inputs is considerably
lower.  Although  physicians  were reluctant  or too  uninformed  to  realize the
existence of shortages, some did report a lack of consumables, working equipment
or other inputs.  For outpatients, emergency and inpatients the proportion of
reported shortages was 12.6,  6.9 and 6.3, respectively.  Based on these findings,
outpatient  services  appear  to  be  particularly  disadvantaged  in  access  to
nonpersonnel  inputs, but  higher level medical  staff provide  the bulk  of the
medical attention.
Another means of measuring shortages is  through examination of ordered and
completed diagnostic tests.  Ordered tests are those requested  for the patient
by the physician in  writing.  Completed tests are those performed for the patient
by Aybar Hospital. 7 '  A diagnostic test order does not guarantee that the test
will be conducted by the hospital.  Table 2  compares the ordered versus completed
tests in the emergency rooms, outpatient clinics, and inpatient wards.
The number of  ordered and  the proportion of diagnostic tests completed vary
across services.  Outpatients have a large number of tests ordered relative to
other patients, particularly for laboratory tests.  The ratio between the number
of lab tests ordered and the number of patients is only about half for emergency
patients, compared to 139 percent for outpatients.  However the completion rate
for outpatient lab tests is less than 10 percent, as compared to 70.0 and 71.1
percent, respectively for  emergency and inpatient lab  tests.  This means that the
number of completed outpatient tests is only about a third the number completed
for emergency patients.  The hospital gives priority to emergency and inpatient
laboratory analyses, which may account for the large discrepancy  in completion
between outpatient and these other two services.
The pattern is somewhat similar for x-ray.  During the survey period, 255
radiology procedures were ordered.  Roughly 42  percent of all ordered X-rays were
for  emergency  room  patients,  an  additional  40  percent  were  ordered  for
outpatients, End the remaining 18 percent were for inpatients.  Completion rates
were  much  higher  for  the  inpatients  and  emergency  room  patients  than  for
7/ It is conceivable that tests are completed by an outside laboratory, but
these are neither subsidized nor are they guaranteed.  No information is
available on whether  laboratory tests were carried out commercially  once the
patient left the hospital.Table  2
Summary  of  Shortages  and  Ancillary  Services  Provision  for
Outpatients,  Emergency  and  Inpatient  Services
Outpatients  Emergency  Inpatient
Number  of  Patients  1554  1616  61
Lab Tests
Number  Ordered  2,163  830  152
%  Completed  9.1%  70.0%  71.1%
X-Ray Tests
Number  Ordered  101  108  46
%  Completed  27.7%  72.2%  60.9%
Norinvasive  and
Pathology  Tests
Number  Ordered  128  88  35
%  Completed  69.5%  90.9%  57*'.%
Reported  Shortages  of
Any  Kind  12.6%  6.9%  6.3%
Source:  The  Urban  Institute11
outpatients.  Roughly 72 percent of all X-rays ordered for emergency department
patients  were  actually  performed,  compared  to  61  percent  of  orders  for
inpatients, and only 28 percent  for outpatients.  The cardiology and general
medicine  clinics were  responsible  for the  largest numbers of ordered X-rays.
Approximately  44 percent  of the X-rays ordered  by physicians  in the  general
medicine clinic were actually performed, compared to 32 percent of the radiology
procedures ordered by cardiologists.  Completion rates across all the  outpatient
departments were generally low.  Chest x-rays were the most trequently performed
radiology procedures.
For the noninvasive tests, once again the largest number of services were
ordered for outpatients, followed by emergency patients and inpatients.  Almost
ninety-one percent of all special services requested for emergency patients was
completed.  Roughly  70 percent of the  services ordered  for outpatients  were
completed, while inpatient orders were completed only 57 percent of the time.
Major  mitigating  factors  for outpatients  are that  the hospital  is not
necessarilv responsible for  the uncompleted tests and  modest fees are levied for
some services.  Some patients prefer to use private or other public sources and
some neglect to submit the request.  Thus, uncompleted tests are due to a number
of factors.  The hospital is responsible for providing insufficient information
to patients on how to proceed, not following up on patients  (i.e., setting up
subsequent appointments or checking up on test results), and for shortages that
prevent conducting tests.  Patient preferences and behavior account for some of
the  uncompleted  tests,  but  how much  cannot  be measured  without  a  follow-up
household survey of patients.
The conclusion from  these data is  that patients are not receiving the basic
level of services that public hospitals are intended to provide.  It suggests
further that the quality of attending physicians as well as the availability of
other medical inputs and diagnostic tests is sufficiently low that basic quality
of care is jeopardized.  The qualifications of attending physicians are low and
they are largely unsupervised, which brings into  question whether the appropriate
inputs are even being ordered.  Thus the  issue is not only what  the hospital
lacks  in nonpersonnel  inputs, which  has been outlined  here, but whether  the
inputs ordered  are those that are required.  This  is the subject of the next
subsection.
Comparison of Norms and Clinical Practices
Norms can be applied to examine how well  clinical practices  conform to
acceptable  patterns  of  diagnosis  and  treatment.  They  provide  an  objective
standard to determine  the frequency with which required diagnostic  tests were
ordered by physicians; whether patients received the specified drugs for their
diagnoses; whether the proper instruments and equipment were used; and whether
the appropriate  amount  and category of consumables was used  in diagnosis  and
treatment.  The  analysis  in  the  next  subsection  is  confined  to  analyzing
physician ordering of diagnostic tests and drugs.
The clinical norms for  this project were developed by a group of Dominican
physicians  (see Appendix F in Lewis et al., 1990) for selected diagnoses,  to
establish a standard upon which to compare diagnostic and treatment practices of12
attending physicians in  the Dominican Republic.  This project has  developed norms
for specific diagnoses for the Dominican Republic that can be used not only for
this project but for  quality control and quality measures throughout the country.
Norms for clinical practice are virtually nonexistent in the Dominican Republic.
Dominican-specific  norms were required to define what was appropriate in
that country's context, given local epidemiological and financial realities, and
limited access to some inputs.  It was unrealistic  to apply high cost, high-
technology approaches from more developed countries without careful assessment
of their appropriateness to Dominican circumstances.
The norms developed for this project are simple listings of the nature of
the  diagnoses,  and  the  diagnostic  tests,  quantity  of  specific  consumables,
instruments and equipment, drugs, and surgery gowns, where relevant, needed to
provide a basic level of care.  Skeletal norms consisting largely of lists were
designed to avoid long, complicated and often confusing explanations of medical
procedures.  Clearly stated norms were required, emphasizing the inputs needed
to define an adequate level of  quality of care.  The norms needed to be in a form
that  would  permit  costing  of  appropriate  diagnoses  and  treatment  for  each
diagnosis.
The diagnoses included are high volume services of Aybar Hospital.  They
include hernia, acute tonsillitis, appendicitis, cataract surgery, hypertension
and diarrhea.  This method for measuring quality is experimental.  It does not
allow for medically acceptable substitutes, which is a reality in any medical
setting, and does not account for  physician's possible knowledge of a  particular
patient's  medical  history.  Thus,  the  results  need  to be  tempered  and  the
limitations kept in mind in interpreting the findings.
The norms apply to outpatient, inpatient and emergency services, although
the applicability of the diagnoses to each service varies.  Table 3 summarizes
the sample of patients used in the comparison of norms and actual treatment, and
inr:ludes  the number of patients  in each diagnostic  category and the services
where they were seen.  Hypertension is the most common of the diagnoses in the
sample.  Over 200 patients were seen over the course of a week.  Appendicitis is
the smallest sample.  Inpatient diagnoses are the smallest category because of
the small overall sample of that service  (61  patients).
Diagnostic Tests.  The comparison between the number of indicated tests
under the norms and proportion of diagnostic  tests ordered,  and between  norm
costs and norm-specified costs covered by the hospital are provided in Figure 1.
Comparisons among the costs of the full complement of norm-specified tests, the
actual hospital expenditure on  all (specified  and non-specified) diagnostic tests
and the cost to the hospital of the diagnostic tests completed according to the
specified norms is provided in Table 4 for the six diagnoses.  The criteria for
whether  a  test,  or  drug  (see below),  should  be  ordered  is  rigidly  defined
according to the norms.  No deviation is accepted as a substitute.  That is, if
the norms state that penicillin  is required and ampicillin was provided,  the
treatment is out of compliance with the norm.  This may be overly rigid, but is
provided here in this form to indicate the extent of specific compliance withTable 3
Number  of  Sampled  Patients  with  Selected  Diagnoses  for  Quality
of  Care  Measures  by  Hospital  Service
Number  of
Total  Number  of  Emergency  Number  of  Number  of
Diagnoses  Samplea  Outpatients  Patients  Inpatients Surgeries
Hernia  56  28  8  17  3
Acute  Tonsilitis  101  32  69  0  0
Appendicitis  23  8  9  4  2
Cataract  Surgery  34  27  0  3  4
Hypertension  204  144  60  0
Diarrhea  83  10  73  0
Source: The  Urban  Institute
a.  Each  diagnosis  sample  consists  of  all  patients  presenting  with  that  dz,Src's:
during  the  period  of  the  survey.Figure  1
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Comparison of Costs of Norms and Actual Expenditures
for Diagnostic Tests of Selected Diagnoses  (DR$)
Total
Actual  Expenditure  on
Number of  Expected  Expenditure on  Norm-Specified
Tests Specified  Cost of  Tests Specified  & Unspecified
Diagnoses  in Norms  Meeting  Norms  in Norms  (Other) Tests
Hernia  9  $606.73  39.05  $44.35
Acute Tonsilitis  1  231.29  47.47  38.93
Appendicitis  5  121.60  37.09  55.63
Cataract Surgerya  6  216.07  26.90  69.70
Hypertensionb  13  3,591.95  217.87  200.16
Diarrhea  0  0.00  19.75  n.a.
Total/Average  7  4,767.64  388.18  409.20
Source:  The Urban Institute
a.  Outpatient only.  No emergency cases.  Unclear when inpatient tests complet-I
The data suggest it may be prior to admittance.
b.  Outpatient and emergency only.13
accepted Dominican practice.  As a  result the  findings should be interpreted with
caution.
The tests discussed  here are ordered, not completed,  tests.  The costs
associated with the ordering is meant to provide a comparison with the norms so
that the "savings" from deficiencies in medical care quality can be measured.
The "savings" due to uncompleced tests has already been discussed above.
The number  of tests  indicated, based  on the norms, were  costed out by
estimating  diagnostic  test costs for the hospital.  For those tests that the
hospital does  not conduct,  prices  were excluded  for both  the  norms  and the
hospital costs.  This will, therefore, underestimate the true cost of meeting
basic standards of care.  The tests that are not performed by the hospital's lab
are included in  Figure 1, showing the proportion of the indicated tests that were
ordered.  It is the cost component in Table 4, columns 2 and 3, where the costs
are excluded.  This omission has obvious implications for quality of care.  If
norms indicate that certain tests should be provided for patients with a given
diagnosis  and the hospital  never performs  such tests, then quality  standards
cannot be met unless the hospital is willing  and has sufficient resources  to
purchase goods and services outside the facility.  What is important, however,
is  that  quality  standards  cannot  be  met  from  the  outset  under  current
circumstances where all required diagnostic tests are not even available.
The actual costs of providing the necessary tests to all patients arriving
with the diagnosis is provided in column two of Table 4.  Column four indicates
how much  all  completed  diagnostic  tests  cost the  hospital.  In many  cases,
multiple tests not called for in  the norms were ordered.  This may be due to the
ordering of tests related to the secondary or tertiary diagnoses rather than the
primary diagnosis.  This analysis relied solely on the primary diagnosis  for
selection of patients  into the quality of care  sample and  for specifying the
norms.  Thus the total expenditure on diagnostic tests (column  4) may exceed what
should have been spent.
Column two sums the diagnostic test costs as indicated by the norms for
five  diagnoses  from  the  sample  (diarrhea  is  excluded  since  no  tests  were
indicated in the norms).  Figure 1 shows the cost of tests ordered according to
the norms as a proportion of the total cost  of the norms.  This provides the
propcrtion of "savings" from not  ordering the diagnostic tests needed to  properly
diagnose  and  treat  a particular  ailment.  Alternatively,  it is the  fraction
representing hospital compliance with the Dominican norm.
Twenty  percent or  fewer of diagnostic  tests  indicated by the norms are
ordered for patients presenting with the sampled diagnoses.  With hypertension,
only 5.2 percent  of the required tests  are ordered.  Compliance  here  is the
number of ordered tests divided by the total number of indicated tests across
patients for each diagnosis.  Thus the proportions  indicate whether  any tests
were ordered but does not specify which ones.  Typically,  some tests  are not
ordered for any patient and a few  are ordered for many.  In no instance was a set
of tests indicated by the norms ordered for all patients.14
The  hospital  spends  only  a small  fraction  of the  cost  of diagnostic  tests
called for under a basic standard  of care.>' The "savings" for these five
diagnoses  over a one week  period  amount  to $DR4,358.44  (US$694.02),  or over  90
percent  of  the  resource  cost  of  DR$4,767.64  (US$759.18).  Moreover,  as  mentioned
above,  this is an  underestimate  because  the  costs  of needed  tests  not  performed
by the hospital  are  excluded  from  the savings  estimates.  This is balanced  to
some unknown extent by patients who have alreaAy been diagnosed and have
completed  test results.
The implication  of these  results  is that  quality  is  quite  low  as measured
by compliance  with  Dominican  norms  for  diagnostic  testing,  at least  for  certain
diagnoses.  Although  these data represent  only a sample  of the diagnoses  the
hospital  treats, there is no reason  to believe  that they represent  extremes.
Observation,  experience  and  interviews  suggest  that  these  are  not  exceptions  but
are instead  indicative  patterns  for  the general  patient  population.
DruQs. The  comparison  between  indicated  drugs  and  the  number  and  value  of
those received  by patients  for  the six diagnoses  are  provided  in Figure  2 and
Table S.  The information  is similar  to that provided  for diagnostic  tests in
Figure  1  and  Table  4.  The  criteria  for  whether  a  drug  was ordered  are  the same
as  that  for  diagnostic  tests,  and  no  deviation  from  the  norms  is  considered.  The
drug definition  is based  on the  WHO drug  code number.
Drug ordering  differs  from  diagnostic  tests  in  that  some  drugs  only  apply
to inpatients  or to surgical  procedures  (i.e.,  anesthesia). In  either  case  this
is  indicated  in  the  footnotes  to  the  table. The  use  of  drugs  in  surgery  is  based
on drug use  recorded  in the sample  of surgeries.
The  average  number  of drugs  required  ranges  from  one for  mild  diarrhea  to
six  for  appendicitis. The latter  is due  to some  extent  to surgical  procedures,
which require  additional  drugs  for  both  anesthesia  and fighting  post-operative
infection. As shown  in  Figure  2,  on average  30.6  percent  of required  drugs  are
ordered  for  patients,  a significant  increase  above  the  12.1  percent  average  for
diagnostic  tests. For  cataract  surgery,  almost  63  percent  of  the  indicated  drugs
are  ordered  for  patients.
The  hospital  spends  a small  percentage  of the  amount  required  to meet the
value  of drugs indicated  by the  norms. As indicated  in  Figure  2  on  average  9.4
percent  of the  expected  expenditure  on  drugs  is  spent  by  the  hospital. The  range
is between  less than 1 percent  for appendicitis  to 65.3 for cataract  surgery.
Drugs  are  not  provided  to  emergency  appendicitis  patients,  and  the inpatients  in
the sample  received  only two  of the  six  drugs  indicated  in  the norms. Cataract
surgery  patients  have  drugs  ordered  that  exceed  the  value  of the  drugs  indicated
in  the  norms  and  they  receive  a  sBgnificant  proportion  of  what  is  required  by  the
norms.  The reasons for  the divergence  from the nor.ns  was not  pursued in the
survey.
8/ This calculation  assumes  that all  ordered  tests  are completed,  which is
unrealistic  given  the high proportion  of uncompleted  tests.  Thus the total
"savings"  are greater  than those  reported  here.Figure 2
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Comparison  of Norms  and Compliance  for  Drugs
Across  Selected  Diagnoses
(DR$)
Actual  Total
Number  Expected  Expenditure  Expenditure  on
of  Drugs  Cost  of  on  Drugs  Norm-Specified
Indicated  Meeting  Specified  & Unspecified
Diagnoses  in  Norms  Norms  in  Norms  (Other)  Drugs
Hernia  4a  $148.80  $79.46  $212.28
Acute  Tonsillitisb  2  4,387.44  200.59  1,250.24
Appendicitis  6a  160. 76c  0.12  5.77
Cataract  Surgeryc  4a  56.01  36.57  109.13
Hypertensiond  4  752.76  227.26  1,085.89
Diarrhea  1- 3e  679.77  39.78  145.54
Total  3.7  6,185.54  583.78  2,808.85
Source: The  Urban  Institute
a. Drugs  required  for  treatment  and  for  surgery.
b.  Data  only  indicates  the  number  of  individual  drug  orders  made  were  consistent
with  the  norms. It  does  not  indicate  that  the  necessary  quantity  (e.g.,  10
day  therapy)  was  provided  in  each  case.
c. Applies  only  to  inpatients.
d.  There  is  very  wide  variation  in  both  the  numbers  and  costs  for  hypertensive
patients.  For  example,  in  emergency,  one  drug  is  ordered  58.3%  of  the  time.
but  no  other  drug  is  ordered.
e. Number of  drugs  required  varies  by  severity  of the  diagnoses.  The  figures
reported  here  are  for  moderate  cases  and  2  drugs.15
The level of hospital expenditures on drugs outside the norms exceeds the
expected cost of drugs under the norms for some  diagnoses.  For cataract surgery,
hernias and hypertension the hospital spends more on drugs than would be spent
if the norms were followed.  However, it is  not clear whether it is substitutions
among  drugs, or additional drugs due to  complications or secondary diagnoses that
inflate the cost of drugs.  Moreover the reasons for  variation from  good clinical
practice  are  not evident.  Conceivably,  shortages  of  some  drugs  may  force
substitution of more or different drugs any of which may be more costly than
those indicated in  the norms.  Overall, expended drugs represent about 45  percent
of the cost of the required drugs under the norms.
The  "savings"  from  not  ordering  drugs  is  substantial.  DR$5,601.76
(US$892.00)  is  saved from not ordering the indicated drugs.  This means that on
average only 9.4 percent of the required drugs are provided to patients.  Only
DR$3,376.69  (US$537.69) is saved (or 60 percent of norm cost) if the comparison
is  between the value of what should have been ordered and what the hospital spent
on drug treatment beyond the norms for these patients.
A striking result from this analysis of drug ordering is the high cost of
certain  drug  therapies.  In particular,  the cost of treating  tonsillitis  is
extremely high because it entails ten days of antibiotics that are very costly.
There  are  alternative  therapies  for sorne  conditions  that  can  be  treated  by
equally effective and less  costly drugs, but these are not the products specified
in the norms.  Every drug has a  price attached to it, based on where the hospital
has obtained the drugs.  The relative costs of drugs available in the hospital
are generally unknown to physicians, however.  Without knowledge about how much
drugs cost or encouragement to use less expensive drugs over other, more costly,
alternatives,  there  is  neither  the  information  nor  the  incentive  to  adapt
prescription practices to financial realities.  These circumstances will inflate
hospital  drug  costs,  which  are  a  significant  proportion  of  total  costs,
especially for inpatients.  Moreover it is not clear whether or to what extent
alternative or additional expenditures enhance quality.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The study has demonstrated the fallacies implicit in earlier cost studies
that a basic level of quality and efficiency can be assumed in public hospitals.
The  low quality and efficiency in Aybar Hospital raises questions regarding the
appropriateness  of  expenditure  studies  in guiding  health  policy.  Moreover,
Donabedian's  (1988)  model  is  ideal  for  measuring  quality  in  a  developing
country's public hospital setting.
Budget data in public hospitals do not accurately reflect costs.  First,
because they underestimate the resources  required to provide a basic level of
service to patients  (i.e., they do not measure  efficiency).  Second, because
budget figures mask qualitative differences that effectively save resources but
reduce quality of care, the implicit, underlyin  assumption of quality in public
hospitals is unlikely to hold.16
The  quality  of  care  in  Aybar  Hospital  is  low,  although  there  is
considerable  variation  across  specialties.  overall,  however,  based  on  the
performance and level  of physician training, the frequency of shortages, the high
deviation from accepted norms for the Dominican Republic, and savings from both
not  ordering  and not completing  basic  diagnostic  tests  and drugs, Dominican
medical practice  in Aybar Hospital is not meeting a basic standard quality of
care.
The qualifications of medical staff diagnosing and treating patients are
inadequate given the heavy reliance on students and their lack of supervision.
It represents a serious compromise of health care quality.  Interns, and first
and second year residents provided over 60 percent of all inpatient and  emergency
care, with minimal if any medical supervision.  Nurse auxiliaries provided 82 to
99 percent of all nursing services and supervision  is virtually  nonexistent.
Part  of the  latter  can be  explained  by the  small number  of graduate  nurses
assigned to the hospital.  Physicians appear to be in  oversupply according to the
budget  and  physician  numbers,  but  they  appear  to  concentrate  on  treating
outpatients.  These results raise serious questions about whether quality health
care  can  be  delivered  at  the  hospital  beacause  the  availability  of  medical
personnel  for  patient  care  is  inadequate.  This  is  despite  a  significant
budgetary allocation to medical manpower and physicians in particular.
The reasons for the poor quality of care have to do with government health
policy  and  its management  of public  hospitals,  uncertain  qualifications  and
training  of  physiciar.s, and  insufficient  resources.  Hospitals  expected  to
operate with  insufficient resources are  forced to compromise  the quantity  of
services, which inevitably affects quality of care.  Not completing tests, not
repairing equipment and other lapses which affect quality can often be traced to
a lack of resources.
Resource  constraints  can  be  relieved  tc  some  extent,  however,  by
improvements in efficiency and in incentives for hospitals and medical staff.
Even with improved efficiency, however, resources will likely be inadequate to
meet a basic Dominican  standard of care, based on the evidence provided here.
Given budget levels and the current "savings" documented above from not ordering
or completing tests  and drugs  for six diagnoses, as well  as the evidence  on
overall noncompletion of ordered tests and shortages in the hospital, resources
recouped  from greater  efficiency are not likely to be sufficient  to meet the
current  resource gap.  Pruning physician roles, however, would  contribute  to
improved resource allocation.  There is an oversupply of physicians relative to
patient  levels,  beds,  and  services  provided  to patients.  Consideration  of
alternative  mixes of manpower,  particularly  the physician-nurse  balance,  and
means of encouraging both higher quantity and quality of services from  physicians
are key to reducing costs and improving quality.
Government policies regarding  the hiring and  supervision of  physicians; the
serious constraints on hospital managers regarding both staffing and access to
subsidized  drugs  and other  inputs; and  rigidities  in the  allocation  of  the
nonpersonnel  budget  overly  constrain  hospital managers'  abilities  merely  to
operate the hospital, much  less control quality.  Indeed, quality control  or
supervision of clinical services does not exist at all, which helps to explain
the lapses cited in this study.  Where staff are not accountable to the hospital17
director, quality standards cannot be enforced in any case, either in hiring or
in performance, and no outside body has the authority or incentive to fill the
vacuum.  Moreover,  there  is no body within  the  hospital  to oversee  medical
practice  from  a  professional  perspective.  In  short,  there  is  no  quality
assurance system to substitute for, or complement medical staff management.
The  issue  of  the  adequacy  of  training  is  apparent  from  the  minimal
instL'uction  that occurs at Aybar Hospital, a recognized teaching facility, and
the common medical practices of the physicians providing care.  It is a topic
well beyond this study but one that deserves to be addressed further if quality
of care is to be ensured.
Recommendations
Reform  in Health Services Delivery.  Transfer of authority to hospital
directors for managing facilities is essential.  They are responsible for
hospital  services  but  currently  do  not  have  the  authority  to  control  the
personnel, services or the quality of services provided.  Incentives to prevent
abuse by making  directors  accountable for hospital performance  are needed to
complement the transfer  of authority and provide the appropriate  signals for
public managers.  This reform is  critical  to improving hospital management, which
in turn is the key to improving health services at public hospitals.  Without it
few other reforms can be effective.
Resources of the system also need to be reallocated.  It is  clear from  this
analysis that there are too many physicians relative to their contribution, and
that some ancillary services may not be receiving the full complement of staff
or  supplies  and  patients  certainly  receive  low  quality  nursing  services.
Adjusting the  mix of personnel could promote an improved team approach to patient
care as well as allocate resources  more efficiently and effectively.
Although the ancillary services also  require improved personnel oversight
and management,  working  conditions  are poor.  Inappropriate,  insufficient  or
marginally operating equipment, uneven supplies of reagents and consumables all
contribute to demoralized and  underperforming staff.  Poor  working conditions and
shortages of drugs and other consumables extend to wards and other parts of the
facility although as mentioned above, the survey was conducted during a period
of  relative  plenty.  Much  of the  problem  is due  to  insufficient  resources;
however, reallocation away from  personnel to address some of the  infrastructure
probleme  that define  the working  environment  may help  to motivate  staff  and
provide the necessary complementary inputs.
The policy  issues are  closely  intertwined with  other  areas  for reform
discussed below.  Indeed, the following subsections elaborate  on many of the
subjects raised here.
Options for Cost Containment.  Cost containment is an important aspect of
improving the quality of care.  Reducing costs can lead to greater efficiency,
higher  productivity  and  enhanced  quality  because  needed  inputs  are  more
available.  Containing costs, however, involves structural policy changes as well
as adjustments at the hospital level.  Arny  serious containment of costs will18
entail a major  restructuring  of the way public health care  is delivered  and
financed.  Indeed,  reform  of  the  medical  personnel  system  as  well  as  the
introduction of basic management tools are key to reducing costs.
At the hospital level, basic management tools need to be established and
appropriate  incentives  put in place to ensure  their use.  More  importantly,
hospitals need better and more systemcAic access to in-kind inputs, and their
priority supplies need to be considered in  SESPAS bulk ordering.  The latter has
already been considered above.
A potentially valuable means of containing costs and improving physician
performance  is through an incentive system that rewards efficient performance.
Under current arrangements  financial incentives are not permitted, and salary
levels and adjustments are the sole purview of SESPAS.  Current incentives are
perverse and promote inefficiency and poor performance.
A related recommendation is encouragement in the use of generic drugs and
those provided to the hospital  gratis.  Physicians are not aware of the relative
prices of drugs.  Moreover, costs to the hospital of the same drug will vary
depending on the source.  Better information  to and incentives for physicians and
improved  stocking  procedures  that  promote  free  or  low-cost  drugs  could  be
beneficial.
Another  aspect of cost containment  is controlling  patient numbers.  As
efficiency  improves additional patients can be treated.  Moreover,  as quality
improves, patient composition is not likely to remain constant as higher income
users  are  attracted  to  the  facility.  Since  care  is  free,  some  method  of
targeting subsidized services and rationing health care will be needed.  These
are important since a dramatic  rise in patient demand due to improvements  in
efficiency and/or quality will not contain costs.  Indeed, it is likely to have
the opposite effect of increasing the number of patients and thereby the overall
costs.
Generalizability  of Study Results & Recommendations  for Additional Study
The study has carefully measured costs, quality, and thB costs of quality
and efficiency  in a single hospital  in the Dominican Republic.  Expansion  to
include additional  facilities within the public network as well as comparisons
with private health care delivery would place Aybar Hospital's experiences  and
costs  in context,  and permit estimates of average  costs  for the  system as a
whole.  Controlling for  Dominican practice and  efficiency standards in  public and
private sectors would allow more accurate interpretations of the findings.
The methodology  is highly  replicable.  The  structure  and operation  of
public hospitals are not significantly different in most developing countries,
and the dearth of good cost information is virtually identical.  Moreover, the
approach  is appropriate  to the needs of both policymakers  and managers as the
results provide insights into the scope, operation, and limitations, as well as
the costs, of hospitals and hospital systems.19
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